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FROM ‘POST TRUTH’ TO E-PERSONS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SCIENCE
COMMUNICATION
Robots, AI, and the question of ‘e-persons’ — a panel at
the 2017 Science in Public conference, 10–12 July 2017
Michael Szollosy
In response to EU draft legislation on robots and artificial intelligence
— which included the headline-grabbing proposals to introduce rights for
‘e-persons’ and necessitating that robots come equipped with a ‘kill
switch’ — a diverse group of experts and academics gathered in Sheffield
as part of the Science in Public 2017 conference. Panellists and the
audience discussed the origins and implications of the ideas behind the EU
initiative, and more specifically, whether robots or artificial intelligence
qualifies for right as ‘persons’, and how the EU proposal imagines robots
and artificial intelligence in particular, historically-contingent ways that
influence or distort our present discussions and attempts to legislate on the
future use and development of technology.
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In January 2017, the European Union Legal Affairs committee voted to adopt (by 17
to 2, with 2 abstentions) the resolutions in a report calling for the European
Commission to put forward new rules for the legal governance of robots and
artificial intelligence.1 Though the report contained some very wide-ranging and,
some say, radical proposals, the vote itself was merely one stage in a long and
on-going process to re-evaluate a set of laws and guidelines with regard to robots
and artificial intelligence. The British newspapers, however, particularly the tabloid
press (notorious for bad science reporting and hostile to most things coming out of
the EU) seized upon this announcement and offered their readership some
dramatic headlines. The Daily Mail, always reliably panic-stricken, though as
Britain’s second-highest selling newspaper (and the most visited news website in
the world2) not something that can be ignored in terms of shaping public opinion,
greeted the news with the headline,
1http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170110IPR57613/robots-legal-affairs-
committee-calls-for-eu-wide-rules.
2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16746785.
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‘Robots should be given legal status as “electronic persons” and must be fitted
with “kill switches” to prevent a Terminator-style rise of the machines, warn
EU MEPs’3
The article featured not one but three pictures of the genocidal, bipedal Terminator
robot, despite the fact that this is entirely fictional robot and not at all mentioned in
the Legal Affairs Committee’s report.
In March, Tony Prescott, Director of Sheffield Robotics, and I, a Research Fellow on
the social and cultural impacts of robotics and AI, issued a call for papers in order
to arrange a panel at the Science in Public 2017 conference that was to be held in
Sheffield in July. The theme for this year’s conference was ‘Science, Technology and
Humanity’ and, specifically, how rapid scientific and technological change force us
to question what it means to be human.
We proposed a panel that would look in more detail at this category of ‘electronic
persons’ mentioned in the EU report: the feasibility, the usefulness (or otherwise) of
the idea and the implications (social, economic, ethical, philosophical) for both
these new electronic persons and the more traditional, fleshy sort. We sought to
understand the concept of ‘electronic personhood’, in its specific (and potential
future) contexts in legislation, and in the context of the report’s wider
recommendations and for human societies more generally.
We received many proposals for papers, and organised the papers to present two
sessions at the Science in Public conference on 10 July, 2017. I introduced
proceedings and delivered the first paper, beginning with a summary of the Legal
Affairs Committee’s report and some examples of reactions to the report in the
popular media. I explained how, despite being potentially valuable in clarifying
some of the legal issues surrounding robots, the entire report and, more specifically,
the notion of e-persons, are problematic in terms of their contexts: in situating
robots and AI within a particular historical and ideological space, from
Frankenstein to Asimov, the report reproduces very old and largely inaccurate
conceptualisations of both robots and human beings. I exposed these historical
origins, going back to the Enlightenment and how ideas of ‘automatons’ (and later,
fictional robots) came to be touchstones through which we tried to understand our
changing relationship with technology. The EU report therefore fails to regard
robots and AI in a useful, accurate way and instead uses robots as a proxy for more
fundamental (and largely unspoken) debates about what it means to be human.
I explained how this approach to policy-making on robotics, however
well-intentioned, exacerbates public fears about robots, and enables this
long-familiar narrative of robots as the nemesis of humanity. This popular
conception demonstrates how robots become containers for cultural anxieties about
what it means to be human, and how such anxieties have a negative impact
particularly on the potential beneficial impacts of social robotics, robots as they
could be employed in education or care. I concluded with an assessment, in this
light, of the recommendations that are before the EU Commission, and make some
concrete recommendations of my own as to how they might better be re-imagined
for the benefit of robots and humanity.
3http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4113674/Robots-fitted-kill-switches-prevent-
Terminator-style-rise-machines-warn-EU-MEPs.html#ixzz4grk8e2Sv.
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Next to present was Aida Ponce Del Castillo from the European Trade Union
Institute in Brussels. As a lawyer with an in-depth knowledge of the structures and
operations of the European Parliament, she began by clarifying the status of the
report, and how it might progress though the European bureaucracy, for which all
the panel participants were all grateful. (For the record, the EU Parliament passes a
resolution, which is then presented to the EU Commission. Only the Commission
has executive power to make the Parliament’s resolution law. The Commission can
decide to do something, to do nothing or simply standstill. They have three months
to reply, and since that time has already passed it seems as though they are
deciding to standstill, so it looks unlikely this report will be made into European
law. It seems that the Commission are much more concerned right now with data
protection and machine safety.) So, Ponce Del Castillo does not think that the
resolution will lead to new legislation across the EU, but it has provoked very
important debate (as our panel demonstrates).
Ponce Del Castillo was concerned that even after this report we still don’t know
what a ‘robot’ is; the EU draft legislation does not offer a clear definition. While
such a definition is badly needed, she also warned at the same time against too
rigid a definition, as constant changes in the technology means that there is a risk of
creating obsolete categories and regulatory traps. (She cited the case of EU
legislation on nanotechnology, where there are now static definitions that few are
happy with and do not work with emerging technology.)
Ponce Del Castillo explained on the issue of electronic personhood that if robots
and artificial intelligence are to be considered legal persons they would acquire
rights and obligations, necessarily becoming responsible and accountable. The
important questions and tricky detail would then be what rights and obligations
would be. She also warned that in giving robots liability, as such a move takes
liability away those from behind the technologies, potentially exonerating
designers, engineers and corporations from responsibility for their creations. (This
question was raised often and urgently in the discussion, so it is clearly something
that is of general concern.)
In contrast to such regulation, Ponce Del Castillo looked at the potential application
of ‘soft measures’ in the control of robots and artificial intelligence. However, while
codes of conduct can be useful, they are not instruments of governance.
Certification and technical standards are other possibilities, but both operate on the
basis of members/producers setting their own standards, and exclude
participation from those outside a narrow, closed system. Moving forward, then,
Ponce Del Castillo recommends greater visibility, a registry to ensure transparency,
and a collaboration between all actors and users.
The next to speak, and the final paper in the first session, was Robert Gaizauskas
from the Department of Computer Science at the University of Sheffield, who tried
to answer the question ‘Can robots be e-persons?’ in collaboration with William
Sweet, professor of philosophy from St Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia,
Canada. Gaizauskas began his talk with the conclusion that yes, robots — or, as he
preferred, DIAs, digital intelligent agents — can be e-persons, and therefore are
entitled to some rights. Gaizauskas cited the case of hitchBOT, the robot designed
by Canadian researchers that ‘hitchhiked’ across Canada in 2014 (and parts of
Germany in 2015), but was destroyed when trying to hitchhike across the United
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States.4 Without setting aside the emotional and cultural issues that hitchBOT gave
rise to, Gaizauskas asked whether hitchBOT’s rights were damaged, or whether
this is simply a case of property damage.
Gaizauskas pointed out that the category of ‘human’ and ‘persons’ aren’t actually
identical (as evident, for example, in the case of corporations, or humans that are
kept alive entirely by artificial means). Gaizauskas also demonstrated that we
ascribe different kinds of rights to different kinds of beings, so he took a more basic
question as his starting place: why does a being have rights? Although space does
not permit here a full examination of all 6 models that Gaizauskas offered in
answer to this question, it is clear that robots can be granted rights based on several
of the constituent criteria. To summarise some of the main points, robots, or DIAs,
can have rights
– because they share many properties and characteristics with other
non-human (or non-living) entities that are already granted rights
– because they have interests independent of their makers
– because in executing their programs, DIAs function in ways analogous to
many non-conscious entities (e.g. plants)
– because they can initiate certain processes, and therefore can ‘act’, so should
be considered ‘agents’, at least to some degree
– because they can evoke sympathetic reactions to their conditions (e.g.
hitchBOT)
Furthermore, robots/DIAs can have obligations because they can be considered to
have interests, are able to identify alternative courses of action, identify their own
interests and those of others, reflect upon the likely impact of its actions, carry out
intended actions and adapt their reasoning and behaviour as new information
becomes available. On the question of what sort of obligations robots/DIAs might
have, Gaizauskas listed an obligation to respect human rights and human life (as
corporations must do), and an obligation to help when there is no risk to the robot’s
survival, but not an obligation to follow the law, because sometimes one has a
moral obligation not to follow the law.
The second session began with a presentation from Jonathan Penn, a doctoral
candidate from Cambridge University in the History and Philosophy of Science.
His historical contextualisation centred on the birth of artificial intelligence and the
1956 Dartmouth Summer Research Project (where the term ‘AI’ was coined).
Penn’s particularly centred on Herbert Simon, the political scientist, economist and
sociologist. Penn demonstrated how Simon’s idea of bounded rationality and his
work at the Rand Corporation, where (with Allen Newell) he used computers to
model human decision-making, shaped the early conceptualisations of artificial
intelligence.
Because of the key role these ideas played in the foundations of the ideas of
artificial intelligence, and how this history still implicitly informs our present
4https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/03/hitchbot-hitchhiking-robot-
destroyed-philadelphia.
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conceptualisations, Penn asserts that artificial intelligence — and the question of
e-persons — cannot be separated from the question of public administration. As
with my talk, Penn demonstrated how a (largely hidden) history of artificial
intelligence is still shaping our conversations and attempts at legislation. In the
case of e-persons, as with other attempts to create an ethics and rules for the
governance of robotics and AI, what is also clear is the extent to which these
ideological histories still play a vital role in how we use and perceive technologies;
as a particularly intriguing example, Penn cited Blackrock (the world’s largest asset
manager) and its quest to employ artificial intelligence in financial markets.
The final talk of the session was delivered by Tony Prescott, from the Department of
Psychology at the University of Sheffield. Prescott began with the question, what is
a person? Turning to Locke and Daniel Dennett for answers, Prescott proposed that
a person is a being with reason and language, a being capable of possessing mental
states such as beliefs, capable of relationships and morally responsible for actions,
and someone who is treated as a person by others. None of these qualities, Prescott
points out, requires an actual, material body. Prescott’s answer to this question
shared a great deal with Gaizauskas’s models of why beings are given rights.
For Prescott, the self has many parts: physical, social, temporal, conceptual and
private. These parts of the self develop in different ways at different times and at
different rates. At Sheffield Robotics, Prescott leads a project that is attempting to
replicate these developments in an iCub robot, by giving the robot a physical self
(an awareness of its own body and the space around it) and a temporal self, not just
a sense of its own past history, but an ability to imagine itself in the future. The
question as to where and/or when we might say that artificial intelligence is
(self-)aware is not the only, or even the most important, criteria upon which we can
judge whether artificial intelligence can be deemed to be a ‘person’ as, for Prescott
(as for Gaizauskas) there are many other criteria that would qualify robots and
artificial intelligence as worth for ethical consideration, or of rights and obligations.
Following the presentations, there followed a very lively discussion, involving the
presenters and the audience. It was noted that the papers represented five very
different approaches, and the contributions from the audience added even more
diverse voices to the conversation, which showed a terrific breadth of views and
demonstrated that such a plurality of voices and contributions will be required to
make real progress on the question of ethics and effective governance with robots
and artificial intelligence. There was a great deal of discussion on the questions of
personhood, or ‘e-personhood’, and whether robots and artificial intelligence
qualify for ethical consideration, and on the expanded notions of selfhood and the
basic qualities necessary for rights and obligations offered by Ponce Del Castillo,
Gaizauskas and Prescott. A good part of the discussion also focussed on the public
understandings, or misunderstandings, of robots and artificial intelligence
— unsurprising as the Science in Public conference has a keen interest in science
communication — and, following on from my talk and Penn’s, the role the popular
media and historical contextualisation can play in improving our public
conceptualisations and policy on future technologies. From these discussions, we
have begun to make some hopefully enduring collaborations that will seek to unite
these different approaches in analyses of future legislation, ethics and popular
representations of robots and artificial intelligence.
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